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Making and Evaluating Strategy: 
Learning from the Military 
by 
K. Michael Haywood 
Associate Professor 
School of Hotel and Food Administration 
University of Guelph 
and 
President, Haywood, Bauer and Associates Inc. 
Guelph, Ontario, Canada 
Use of military analogy is rampant and considered an acceptable part of 
business vernacular. However, analogies only illustrate, and bad analo- 
gies make bad strategy. There are important lessons to be learned from 
military strategy, though. This article identifies "the ten principles of 
strategy" that corporate strategists could utilize in testing their strategic 
theories, concepts, and plans. 
In an industry where services are often associated with being 
"kinder and gentler," corporate lingo among hospitality executives 
suggests otherwise. Talk in boardrooms and office corridors is 
peppered with militaristic terms - wars, battles, offensive and defen- 
sive positions. Certainly the competitiveness of the marketplace 
favors military metaphors. The success of books such as Ries and 
Trout's Marketing Warfare ' is in large part due to the search for the 
ultimate corporate weapon and the desire to win the battle against 
competitors for customers. 
The Burger Wars have become a classic textbook case, and 
vestiges of a warlike state exist. Business Week, in its "Industry 1990 
Outlook" issue, began an article on the food service industry as 
follows: 
"Fast Food Joints Are Getting Fried - The Chains Wage 
War for Market Share." Grueling times lie ahead for restau- 
rants and fast-food joints. Troubled by labor shortages and a 
glut of outlets, they face a bruising price war in 1990. The 
first signs of battle already have arrived in the form of 
margin-crunching price specials and promotional pyrotech- 
nics. Says Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. CEO John Cranor: 
In the next 12 months, we'll all be fighting tooth and tong.' 
Military terminology appears to add to an understanding of the 
young science of strategy and creates an element of excitement in 
what otherwise may be considered a dull subject. However, use of 
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such terms and analogies does not prove anything. At best they only, 
illustrate and may indeed be misleading. 
Of all the analogies which have been politically significant in the 
past decade, none has been more important than the attempt to 
liken the Soviet threat with that of Nazi Germany. Both regions have 
been described as warlike; both are said to share a commitment to 
territorial acquisition by means of military expansion, and both are 
totalitarian dictatorships. This analogy was propounded by impor- 
tant members of the Reagan Administration, and therefore presum- 
ably played some part in how the United States thought of dealing 
with the Soviet Union. However, as we now know, the analogy was 
flawed. According to Michael Howard, a "militarist" state such as 
the Sodet Union invests in huge military efforts, but does so in order 
to avoid war, not because it is planning to bring one about. There is 
no "cultural" disposition to go to war in the Soviet Union as there 
was in the "bellicose" state and hyperviolent culture of Nazi 
germ an^.^ However, to those who have what Kissinger calls an 
"inherent bad faith" model of the Soviet Union, there is no attempt 
to understand such actions from the Soviet point of view; instead, 
such behavior is simply categorized according to favored demonic 
analogies. 
Analogies are one way in which people try to comprehend 
complex affairs; however, bad analogies make bad strategy. In the 
corporate world, as in the military, devising the best response will 
not be assisted by imputing false motives. Strategists can, however, 
move beyond military analogies and focus upon "the 10 principles of 
strategy" that have been gleaned from studies of the campaigns of 
the greatest military commanders. These principles can be used as a 
practical checklist to assist sound judgment by the architects and 
appraisers of strategic theories, concepts, and plans. However, users 
should recognize that no two situations are quite alike, and so the 
principles must be applied accordingly. 
Ten Principles of Strategy Stand Out 
A compelling Darwinian force shapes military strategy. While 
those who win battles live and are emulated, losers are only buried. 
The military attaches supreme importance to strategy and has 
evolved an ethos around it. Officers, during their education and 
training, have the 10 principles etched forever in their brains, and 
are expected to have read the military classics. In later staff 
appointments officers are expected to know the questions and how to 
think about them. Strategy becomes their way of life. 
The 10 principles that guide officers are used to help identify as 
many angles to grandiose schemes purported to solve obstinate 
offense and defense problems. They are as follows:" 
1. maintenance of morale and commitment 
2. maintenance of the aim 
3. flexibility 
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4. logistic support 
5. administration 
6. concentration 
7. economy of effort 
8. offensive action 
9. surprise 
10. security 
It is easy to translate these principles into a corporate context. 
In fact, since 1965 a literature on non-military strategy has appeared 
in the planning of every institution. However, in universities, where 
strategic management is taught, and in businesses, where strategic 
management is implemented, the strategic ethos is not always 
evident. Professors and managers use the word "strategy," but do not 
seem to know what it means. There are many specific problems, but 
the  most important is rejection of the  systematic method for 
analysis. Kenichi Ohmae, in his book The Mind of the Strategist: The 
Art of Japanese Business, argues: 
Analysis is the critical starting point of strategic thinking. 
Faced with problems, trends, events or situations that  
appear to constitute a harmonious whole or came packaged 
as a whole by the common sense of the day, the strategic 
thinker dissects them into their constituent parts. Then, 
having discovered the significance of these constituents, he 
reassembles them in a way calculated to maximize his 
advantage." 
Any failure to participate in this habit of.analysis and the 10 
principles of strategy became tainted. 
Morale and Commitment Must be Maintained 
If business and corporate life is anything, i t  is a political 
endeavor in which leadership is the essence of success. Politics are 
about people in institutions struggling against opponents, and war is 
politics by other means. In the final analysis, war, whether hot or 
cold, resolves itself in a test of wills, not just of armed forces, but of 
entire peoples. When the urge to compete is lost, all is lost. 
Leadership, discipline, comradeship, self-respect, and unflagging 
belief in a cause all help build morale; indeed, tradition holds 
military officers solely responsible for it. Unfortunately today, many 
hospitality leaders come from backgrounds and institutions in which 
morale is not highly regarded. At many universities there is an indif- 
ference to morale. 
Morale and commitment of the troops do matter. The military 
seldom asks why, but if the idea needs support, the literature is 
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vast. During the Vietnam war, for example, military and govern- 
ment leaders so focused on the illusion of winning the war that 
political deception and its attendant cynical revelations became 
widespread. For example, just before the Tet offensive in 1968, top 
military officers and their civilian representatives deliberately 
distorted intelligence estimates of enemy troops in order to gain 
political goals. The troops in the field were unaware of these 
deceptions, as  apparently were many high ranking military 
officers. Consequently, the military was caught off guard by the 
fury and success of the Vietcong offensive. Such situations hardly 
instill rank-and-file confidence in leadership. 
In the military, as in business, the challenge is to get everybody 
to identify and adopt the values and goals of the organization. This 
requires involvement; that is, everybody must be immersed psycho- 
logically in the activities of individual roles a t  work. Moreover, 
employees must feel a sense of loyalty or affection for and attach- 
ment to the organization. 
Strategic excellence is based on an organization's ability to affect 
its employees favorably, to enhance their intellectual and skill- 
related abilities, and to make a positive difference in their lives. Just 
as businesses work hard to build value into the products and services 
produced and sold, value must be added to employees if they are to 
be effective in their work and in providing service to customers. This 
philosophy of caring demands that organizations focus their energies 
and that all internal constituencies work toward a common goal - 
the development of human resources. 
Maintenance of the Aim is Paramount 
All men can see the tactics where I conquer, but what none 
can see is the strategy out of which great victory is evolved: 
Sun-tzu.' 
Strategic aim from a military point of view refers to some 
measure or some degree of control over the enemy, either in terms 
of overcoming their forces or their will to fight. With political, 
economic, and social factors impinging on military strategy, 
however, it is necessary to provide a common and basic frame of 
reference for armed forces personnel, politicians, economists, and 
philosophers in their common efforts toward a common aim. Effec- 
tive military strategies, therefore, state an unambiguous one- 
sentence aim, the brevity of which conceals an agony of subjective 
analysis. I t  i s  a single-minded s ta tement  of values which 
subsumes all tactical choices. The aim is not an object; it is an 
image. Explicitly it says what the military is endeavoring to do. 
Implicitly it defines the game. Unless the aim is maintained in 
planning and tactical execution, the strategy will crumble. As 
most military people will admit, the essence of a general's job is to 
assist in developing a clear sense of purpose, to keep the junk from 
getting in the way of important things. 
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Contrary to the beliefs of the noted war historian Karl von 
Clausewitz, that strategy simply is "the use of engagements to 
attain the object of war"; the situation today is different. "The true 
aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so 
advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its 
continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."' This idea is not 
new. Sun-tzu recognized tha t  "to subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill."" 
Developing a single-minded aim for a corporate strategy is a 
vital necessity, stemming from the fundamental yet evolutionary 
threat of being crowded out by competitors, and unsuspectedly by 
non-traditional competitors utilizing new technology. In the biolog- 
ical world, survival of the fittest has always focused on differentia- 
tion. Strategic theorists, such as Michael Porter, are of a similar 
mind.Vifferentiation on the basis of price, product function, time 
or place utility, or simply the creation of an  image that effects 
customer perceptions is important. However, creating value for 
customers and developing a compelling competitive advantage is 
insufficient to ensure long-term organizational survival. There 
must be a sharing of and commitment to specific corporate values 
and dominant beliefs. 
Disney Specifies Values 
Disney Corporation is a prime example of a company with a 
strong culture which, through its legendary president, specifies its 
beliefs and values for all its employees. Disney's beliefs can be found 
not only in its orientation booklets, but in the hearts and minds of its 
devoted employees. There are three strong beliefs: respect for the 
individual, customer service, and excellence. Beyond these beliefs, 
Disney also issues a set of hndamental principles to guide employee 
conduct. These principles deal with such issues as managerial talent, 
technological development, employee development, stockholder return, 
and social responsibility. In fact, Walt Disney suggested that these 
beliefs and principles were more responsible for the company's success 
than its technological and economic resources or its organizational 
structure, innovation, and timing. They also constitute absolutes in 
the sense that whatever else may change, they remain constant. 
In the military as in business, shared values and beliefs must be 
reinforced. Disney employees daily learn what is appropriate and 
what is not. Through their actions and decisions, they know how 
much autonomy they can carve out within the confines of the corpo- 
rate value system, one that is intent on capturing the essence of 
winning, one that in its stability over time provides consistency to 
short-term action and sets a target that deserves personal effort and 
commitment. 
A good strategy is rigid in its values, and flexible in its expres- 
sion. Purposes, policies, plans, and procedures inevitably change. 
This leads to the basic promise enunciated by Admiral Joseph Wylie: 
"No one can predict with certainty the pattern war will take."" 
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There is a need for alternate solutions to potential problems, 
which must be addressed according to their character, immanency, 
importance, and probability of occurrence: 
The player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk 
simply because his opponent soon detects the (deficiency) - 
and counters it. The requirement is for a spectrum of strate- 
gies that are flexible and noncommittal, a theory that by 
intent and design can be applied in unforeseen situations. 
Planning for uncertainty is not as dangerous as it might 
seem; there is, after all, some order in military as well as 
other human affairs. But planning for certitude is the 
greatest of all mistakes." 
In the hospitality industry, physical facilities afford less margin 
for flexibility than intellectual ideas. Deciding where to place 
material emphasis is a matter of considerable consequence, deter- 
mined by assigning priorities. Whatever the verdict, it should be 
imaginative. Triteness in the field of strategy is a deadly sin. 
Experience and observation suggest an unhealthy rigidity 
among many corporate strategists. Failing to realize that neither 
opportunities nor crises can be commanded, they dwell too much on 
strategic plans. Failures in corporate planning are puzzling, for a 
corporate or a business plan has much in common with a military 
operation order. Once an operation begins, its plan rapidly disinte- 
grates as opportunities and misfortunes emerge. So a corporate or 
business plan should disintegrate, but in a different time frame. The 
military commander expects this, and soon abandons the plan, but 
not its underlying strategy. 
In business as on the battlefield, the object of strategy is to 
bring about the conditions most favorable to one's own side, 
judging precisely the right moment to attack or withdraw 
and always assessing the limits of compromise correctly. 
Besides the habit of analysis what marks the mind of the 
strategist is an intellectual elasticity or flexibility that 
enables him to come up with realistic responses to changing 
situations not simply to discriminate with great precision 
among different shades of grey." 
Logistic Support and Administration Provide Resource 
Napolean Bonaparte is reputed to have said, "An army marches 
on its stomach." Logistics and administration are the principles that 
provide many of the resources that strategy puts to work. As any top 
commander will admit, no battles can be won unless soldiers can 
hold and gain ground in war. During World War I1 this meant a 
ground Army supported by tactical aviation with supply lines 
guarded by the Navy. Logistics - the provision, movement, and 
maintenance of all services and resources necessary to sustain 
military forces - is, therefore, inseparable from administration, the 
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management of all services and resources necessary to sustain 
military forces. 
Strategy must be activated, not just preached. In other words, 
nothing happens until resources are committed, and for an ongoing 
strategy, disintegration may occur unless there is continuity in the 
commitment of resources. Resource allocation, however, is of 
immense complexity. It faces three dilemmas: deciding what c&teria 
to use, matching resource needs with resource availability, and 
scheduling resource commitment over time. Moreover, as technical 
innovation continues to improve the capability for waging war, the 
challenge to political and military command in resolving these 
dilemmas intensifies. According to one U.S. official: 
Decisions will be made by computers that have been taught 
(i.e., programmed) all that humans know about war as they 
hypothesize it will be fought with modern weapons. The 
computer will perhaps have expanded upon that knowledge. 
Humans will oversee and override rather than execute. War 
will not only be come as you are but will also be pre- 
programmed.13 
While perhaps excessively sanguine about the use of computers 
in the larger direction and management of combat, the big question 
facing both the military and business is whether current or foresee- 
able systems (human, institutional, and technological) for the 
management of operations will be equal to the growing challenges in 
information and management systems. 
Information Determines Strategy 
What makes information systems of supreme importance is 
primarily the fact that the effectiveness of strategy is now deter- 
mined by information.14 Whether the problem relates to allocating 
resources, improving the conduct of operation, or handling manage- 
ment crises, competitive battles are won or lost on the basis of the 
adequacy of information. What is changing is that the stakes in 
many of these strategic issues are now much higher. Also the scope 
and tempo of these issues may be such that neither the commander 
or manager will have an opportunity to remedy errors they make 
due to poor information. 
The information revolution in both business and military 
spheres leaves the erroneous impression, though, that information 
technology has solved the age-old problems of fog of decision making 
which arise when tactical or strategic information is disregarded, 
incomplete, unconfirmed, deceptive, untimely, unavailable, contra- 
dictory, or misinterpreted. To the contrary, however, in the poten- 
tially information-soaked environment of the modern battlefield or 
corporation, fog of decision making is often an even greater problem. 
Information overload, dysfunctional information, internal failure 
modes, and availability of people to operate and maintain the equip- 
ment suggest that attention be increasingly focused on both the 
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protection of information systems a t  the tactical and strategic levels 
and on ways of countering such protection. 
The challenges posed by the information revolution and the 
advent of information warfare are vexing indeed, compounded by 
how management systems operate in the context of ongoing competi- 
tion for influence or market domination. Of particular importance in 
the military are questions regarding the. ability to escalate use of 
force or threat of force as distinct from launching or repelling an  
attack. In such situations there is a recognized need to move beyond 
technology to look a t  human and institutional questions. For 
example, the following framework which applies equally to the 
military and to business suggests that when evaluating strategic 
decisions, attention should be paid to the following aspects of the 
management of operations: 
Interactions: corporate unit interactions, functional interac- 
tions, service interactions, alliance interactions, competitor 
interactions 
Functional elements: marketing and sales, customer service, 
operational control, financing and accounting, communications 
and data transmission, surveillance and intelligence collection 
Components: institutional, human, technical, procedural 
Dimensions: regional, national, international 
Scenarios and contingencies: type of attack or strategic 
problem, length of encounter - limited, episodic, prolonged 
Phases: pre-conflict, onset, peak, and resolution of conflict 
Substantive: decision making, decision execution 
System qualities: adaptability, reliability, responsiveness, 
resistance, survivability, durability, capacity and comprehen- 
siveness 
Areas of concern: Same as system qualities but dependent on 
scenario and contingencies within scenario, as well as vulnera- 
bilities to external disruption or internal failure mode 
Idiosyncratic factors: Impact of individual, institutional or 
national culture, tradition, experience and technological or 
strategic styles on the design and operation of management 
systems 
While each of these aspects merits attention, there is no sugges- 
tion that they are of equal importance. Although there is clearly 
room for refinement, most of the basic aspects mentioned are suffi- 
ciently commonplace or self-explanatory as to need little justification; 
however, the role each plays in the management of strategy imple- 
mentation is perhaps less obvious. 
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Economy of Effort and Concentration Complete Strategy 
To engage the typical military or business organization's 
fragmented approach to the identification and implementation of 
strategy, logistical support and administration must be associated 
with two more principles, economy of effort and concentration. 
Together these four principles provide a framework for priority 
setting, commitment of resources, alliance building, and political 
trade-offs. Furthermore, they demand a perspective reaching beyond 
purely internal organizational issues. 
Successful execution of strategy in business as  well a s  war 
demands concentrating the proper combination of effort and resources 
a t  the proper time and place to accomplish decisive aims. In war 
proper, application of this principle in conjunction with the other 
principles may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive 
combat superiority. However, primary stress must be devoted to top 
priority projects and the most serious threats, external or internal. The 
side with the initiative enjoys a huge advantage, since it can focus its 
energy on known objectives, while the opposition must dissipate its 
power in preparing for contingencies. 
Available resources, whether human, material, or monetary, 
never are unlimited. Concentration at points of decision, however, 
implies the need for economy elsewhere. This can be achieved in two 
ways: by allotting minimum essential efforts and resources to those 
endeavors that require least emphasis, or by temporarily diverting 
strengths from selected high-priority areas, recognizing that this 
involves calculated risks. In the military, the former method is most 
frequently used, but both call for canny judgment. 
The risks associated with economy of force place a premium on 
flexibility of thought and action. Economy of force missions may 
require limited attack, defense, cover and deception, or retrograde 
actions. In other words, a reserve of strategies is required if the 
situation changes or when a war fails to proceed in accordance with 
the plan in use. 
For the military or corporate strategist, specific encounters or 
situations should be taken up only after logistic, material, and other 
resource requirements have been ascertained. This is a process in 
which the estimation of needs and costs should be based on less 
favorable situations and tempered by judgments as to probabilities 
as well as hazards. 
Game theory is of particular value in this regard and has helped 
sharpen preparedness plans. For example, the business that plans 
for only one strategy runs a great risk simply because its competitors 
may detect the single strategy and counter it. The requirement is for 
a spectrum of strategies that are flexible and non-committal, a 
theory that by intent and design can be applied in unforeseen situa- 
tions. Planning for uncertainty is not as dangerous as it might seem; 
there is, after all, some order in military and business affairs. And, 
as any military historian will tell you, planning for certitude is the 
greatest of all military mistakes. 
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Offensive Action Is Critical 
Most hospitality firms have never looked beyond a purely defen- 
sive posture, which at best can only gain time to organize a counter- 
move. Without offense, defense is incremental failure because it only 
comprises a response or reaction to the move of and the terms set by 
the competitor. Offensive operations, on the other hand, are the most 
effective way to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and with it the 
freedom of action to pursue prescribed aims In war, offensive action 
permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose his will on 
the opposition to engage them at  times and places of his choosing and 
in manners he desires, to exploit enemy weakness and rapidly- 
changing situations, and to react to unexpected developments. 
Defensive action may be forced on a commander as a temporary 
expedient while awaiting an opportunity for offensive action, or may 
be adopted deliberately for the purpose of economizing forces on a 
front when a decision is not sought. Even on the defensive, the 
commander must seek opportunities to seize the initiative and 
achieve decisive results through offensive action. The defense must 
be active, not passive. 
Military strategy places a premium on intellectual offensives as 
well as physical action. This applies particularly to business. Active 
striving for innovative ideas, diplomatic assaults, incessant searches 
for technological break-throughs, and concerted efforts to capture 
people's minds are a few alternative but highly effective initiatives - 
initiatives that will force competitors to react rather than act. 
Surprise Means Not Being Surprised 
To companies like Holiday Inn, the principle of surprise means 
not being surprised. To the military, not being surprised means 
vigilance and reserves. Businesses t ransla te  vigilance into 
research and information, but the need for resources violates the 
principle of efficiency, a basic tenet of economics. 
From a more offensive posture, surprise results from striking 
a competitor a t  a time andlor place and in a manner for which he 
is unprepared, or fails to grasp the full significance too late to 
react effectively. Surprise, aided and abetted by various combina- 
tions of secrecy, effective intelligence, speed, cover, deception, 
originality, and audacity, can shift the balance of power decisively, 
paving the way for victories far out of proportion to the efforts 
expanded. 
Strategic surprise can assume many forms; conventional 
military or corporate surprise involving recognizable forces and 
well-understood procedures may worry competitors the  least. 
Other approaches can have even greater strategic consequence if 
conditions are ripe. Militarily, the psychological surprise of Hanoi's 
1968 Tet offensive unseated President Johnson and precipitated 
widespread pacificism in the United States. Technological surprise 
can be equally devastating. The strategic implications of Sputnik 
I, for example, were unsurpassed. With regard to  all these 
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surprises, however, strategic success is not ensured, but they 
vastly increase the odds in favor of those who utilize them. 
Security Involves Protecting Management 
The last strategic principle is security, the imperative to protect 
the core from catastrophe at  the perimeter. The vital core in 
businesses varies, though it contains the institutional structures and 
human resources that enhance the corporate entity. Security, there- 
fore, results from the measures taken by management to protect 
itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, harassment, or surprise. 
It is a condition that results from the establishment and mainte- 
nance of protective measures against hostile acts or influences." 
Counter-intelligence contributes to that goal by pinpointing 
possible sabotage and subversion and diluting enemy espionage 
efforts. Positive intelligence programs provide critical information 
concerning competitors' capabilities and intentions, thereby guarding 
against surprise. Security, therefore, preserves power and reduces 
the probability that competitor activity, direct or indirect, might 
interfere unduly with vital friendly interests, assets, plans, or opera- 
tions. By reducing vulnerabilities, security increases freedom of 
action. Since risk is inherent in war, application of the principle of 
security does not imply undue caution or the avoidance of calculated 
risk. A good offense often is an outstanding defense. Seizing and 
retaining the initiative can interrupt inimical activity. 
Utilization of the 10 principles of strategy implies that the 
making of strategy is a natural process. Yet no strategic decision 
maker is usually natural all the time. This conundrum can be 
explained by suggesting that strategy is pursued at two levels. First, 
it is pursued at the purely natural level at which attention is focused 
on reasonable and conscious behavior by the cold calculations of 
interests, and, second, it is pursued at a level which examines the 
participants in competition or conflict with regard to conscious and 
unconscious behavior, and with regard to psychological motivations 
as well as logical calculations. 
The first kind of analysis assumes a strategic person who 
evaluates every conceivable action in terms of a costlgain analysis. 
That is typical of a kind of strategic reasoning which assumes both 
rationality and complete knowledge of the value systems of all 
parties in conflict. The 10 strategic principles are part of this 
assumption because they highlight the logic of situations and 
strategies. But when it comes to deciding strategy, the intellectual 
constraint of the strategic person is forced to make way for a more 
human individual, and strategies have to be designed to take 
account of this human unreasonableness. With luck and good 
judgment, military and corporate power can be successfully 
managed. Application of these principles is a step forward in 
realizing this dream. 
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